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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of financial constraints on the internationalization 
strategies of firms. It contributes to the literature by focusing on three aspects: First, the 
paper studies the impact of financial constraints on exporting relative to FDI. Consistent 
with theory, the empirical results confirm that the impact of financial constraints is 
stronger for FDI than for exporting. Second, the paper analyzes the extensive and the 
intensive margins and finds that financial frictions matter for both. Third, the paper 
explores the impact on manufacturing as compared to service industries and shows that 
firms in service industries are affected more than firms in manufacturing. The paper also 
identifies a threshold effect: Financial constraints do not matter for small firms whose 
productivity seems to be too low to consider international expansions.  
Keywords: Multinational firms, exports versus FDI, financial constraints, 
heterogeneity, productivity  
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1 Motivation 
In this paper, we explore the impact of financial constraints on internationalization 
decisions. We consider a firm’s decision to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
in exports, and we assess the importance of financial frictions for this choice as well as 
the volume of activities. Our analysis is motivated by recent trade theory stressing the 
importance of productivity for firms’ international expansions (Melitz 2003). Helpman et 
al. (2004) extend the Melitz model to account for FDI.1 The implicit assumption in these 
models is that firms can finance foreign operations either internally and/or without 
incurring an external finance premium.2 This assumption has been relaxed by recent 
papers that introduce financial constraints into the Melitz-model of exporting (Chaney 
2005, Manova, 2010).3 
We contribute to this literature, first, by investigating the impact of financial constraints 
for exporting and FDI simultaneously, and, second, at the extensive and intensive margin. 
Third, we are able to explore the impact of financial constraints on manufacturing and 
service industries separately. Moreover, as our sample includes a large number of purely 
domestic firms, we are able to identify a threshold effect in the sense that financial 
constraints do not matter for firms too small to consider international expansions. 
We start with a stylized theoretical framework that extends models of exporting (Chaney 
2005, Manova 2010) to include, both, exporting and FDI. This allows us to explore how 
productivity and financial constraints affect firms’ choices between FDI and exports 
when firms have limited internal funds. Referring to the arguments made by Helpman et 
al. (2004), we assume that the upfront investment costs in case of FDI exceed those of 
exporting, whereas the marginal cost of exporting are higher due to iceberg transportation 
cost. In addition to the well known effect that firms need to be more productive to engage 
                                                 
1
  See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for a review of the theoretical and empirical evidence. 
2
  Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2008) analyze a three-country version of the model by Helpman et al. 
(2004) empirically and find that a considerable number of companies indeed uses a combination of 
both strategies to serve foreign markets. However, they do not account for the impact of financial 
frictions. 
3
  Chor et al. (2007) focus on the impact of host country financial development on the relative importance 
of horizontal and vertical FDI.  
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in FDI, we show that financial frictions should matter relatively more for the decision to 
engage in FDI as compared to exporting. Furthermore, studying the interaction of 
productivity and financial constraints, we expect a threshold effect: financial constraints 
should matter only above a critical threshold of productivity (or: size) because firms with 
lower productivity do not consider to invest abroad or to export in the first place.  
For our empirical analysis, we use a large sample of German firms. Our study differs 
from previous work because we combine data for the years 2002 to 2006 from the 
commercial database Dafne (the German equivalent of Amadeus) with data provided by 
the Deutsche Bundesbank in its database on foreign direct investment (MiDi). This allows 
us to draw on information on the extensive and intensive margins of FDI and exports. 
Moreover, we have information on firms from manufacturing and service industries so 
that we can compare the relative importance of financial constraints for these different 
groups of firms.  
We analyze the extensive margin for FDI and exports using both a linear probability 
model and a bivariate probit model. Our strategy with regard to measuring financial 
constraints follows those of previous papers and thus allows comparing our results to 
these findings (e.g. Berman and Héricourt 2010, Greenaway et al. 2007). In particular, we 
study the impact of cash flow as a measure for internal funds. The debt ratio is included 
as a measure for the costs of external finance. Firms with a high debt ratio should, ceteris 
paribus, have a low potential of collateralization and thus a low borrowing capacity.  
Our empirical results confirm that both productivity and financial constraints have a 
significant impact on firms’ intensive and extensive margins of foreign activities. 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that financial constraints matter more for FDI 
than for exporting. Comparing service firms and manufacturing firms, we observe less 
exporting in service industries because many services have to be produced and distributed 
locally. Furthermore, we observe that firms in service industries are affected more by 
financial constraints than firms in manufacturing. One plausible explanation is that 
investment in service industries are less easy to collateralize and, hence, the cost of 
external finance is higher for those firms. Finally, we also identify a threshold effect. 
Financial constraints do not matter for small firms whose productivity seems to be too 
 4
low for international expansion. There is some evidence that the impact of financial 
constraints tapers off for larger firms, in particular as far as the exporting decision is 
concerned.  
Studying the intensive margin with a Heckman selection model, we find that it is crucial 
to account for financial frictions when modeling the selection into foreign status. In 
specifications which account for financial frictions in the selection equation, the inverse 
Mills ratio is not significant for the intensive margin. Hence, we have successfully 
modeled selection on observables. If we do not account for financial frictions, the inverse 
Mills ratio is significant, which means that there are omitted factors which influence 
selection into foreign markets. 
Previous literature provides only limited evidence on the mechanisms stressed by our 
model. Most studies analyze different channels of internationalization (exports or FDI) 
separately. There is evidence indicating that less severe financial constraints increase the 
probability of exporting for Israeli (Ber et al. 2002) and Spanish (Campa and Shaver 
2002) firms as well as for firms from a cross-section of countries (Berman and Héricourt 
2010).4 Greenaway et al. (2007) find a causal relationship running from exporting to 
financial constraints (but not vice versa) for UK firms.5 Bellone et al. (2010), in contrast, 
observe that export starters enjoy better financial conditions.6 In a complementary paper 
(Buch et al., 2010) we have studied the impact of financial constraints on firms’ FDI 
activities. Our focus there is on the relative impact of financial constraints on the 
extensive versus intensive margin, using information on financial constraints at the parent 
and at the affiliate level. We find that financial constraints at the parent level matter more 
                                                 
4
  Harrison and McMillan (2003) also study the link between financial constraints and FDI, but their 
focus is on the impact of inward FDI on the tightness of the domestic credit market. 
5
  See also Greenaway and Kneller (2007). Bridges and Guariglia (2006) test the impact of 
internationalization and financial constraints on firms’ survival probabilities. Using a panel of newly 
established UK firms over the period 1997-2002, they find that higher collateral and lower leverage 
result in lower failure probabilities, while exporting or being foreign-owned does not significantly 
affect these probabilities. 
6
  Evidence on the impact of financial shocks on exports is mixed. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) provide 
evidence that the changes in trade finance account for about one third of the decline in Japanese exports 
in the 1990s. Levchenko et al. (2009) find that trade credit-intensive sectors did not experience above-
average reductions in trade flows during the financial crisis that started in 2007. 
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for the extensive margin whereas financial constraints at the affiliate level matter 
relatively more for the intensive margin. We also investigate the choice of collateral. The 
locational information in our FDI dataset allows exploiting cross-country differences in 
contract enforcement to test our cross-country predictions, information we have not 
available for the firms’ export activities to be studied in this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our theoretical 
framework. Section 3 discusses the data and shows descriptive statics. In Section 4, we 
present the regression results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Exports versus FDI and Financial Constraints: Theory 
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework which allows us to analyze firms’ 
choices between exports and FDI. We want to capture in a stylized way the notion that 
firms may be facing financial constraints when considering their internationalization 
strategy. These financial constraints may arise from firm-specific, sector-specific, or 
country-specific characteristics. Firm-specific constraints may arise for example from a 
firm’s customer structure and thus the probability of being hit by a liquidity shock. Firms 
also differ with regard to the quality of their management and thus the ability of outside 
lenders to extract information on the profitability of the investment projects. Moreover, 
firms’ production and organizational structures differ, which affects the ability of outside 
lenders to extract soft versus hard information about the creditworthiness of firms. These 
structural features also affect the availability of assets that can serve as collateral. While 
differences in customer structure imply that firms differ in their need to rely on external 
finance, the other arguments rationalize why firms differ in the cost at which they have 
access to external finance.  
Sector specific characteristics relate to the production technologies used, which may give 
rise to different possibilities for collateralization. Finally, country-specific financial 
constraints could reflect different structures of financial markets. Since we are not able to 
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take into account country differences in our empirical analysis, we will not model country 
differences in our framework.7 
To see how the model works, consider the decision problem of a firm that serves the 
domestic market but is interested in entering the foreign market as well. The firm has two 
choices. First, it can produce at home and serve both the home and the foreign market via 
exports. Second, it can invest abroad and set up a foreign affiliate to serve the foreign 
market via FDI.8 
To serve the foreign market, the firm has to incur a fixed cost  that depends on the 
mode of entering the foreign market, with 
jF
j X  in the case of exports and in the 
case of foreign investment. Following Helpman et al. (2004), we assume that , 
reflecting the fact that the fixed costs of market entry are higher in the case of FDI. In the 
case of exports, these fixed costs involve setting up a distribution network. In the case of 
FDI, additional overhead functions must be maintained abroad. 
j FDI 
FDI XF F!
Firms produce at a constant marginal cost c /E , where 1E t  captures the productivity of 
the firm. This productivity may differ across firms. Since we focus on the decision 
problem of a representative firm, we omit firm-specific indices.  
The firm faces a cash-in-advance constraint as the costs of entry and production have to 
be paid before revenues are generated. In our model, firms finance the fixed cost of 
market entry and the cost of production using either internally generated funds or external 
credit. We assume that the cost of using external credit are higher than the cost of using 
internally generated funds, due to the well known asymmetric information problems.9 
Moreover, this cost may depend on the availability of collateral.  
We formalize the notion of financial constraints in the following very stylized way: At 
the time of entry the firm expects that with probability (1-q) it will be able to shoulder the 
cost of market entry and of production with internal funds. With probability q, however, 
                                                 
7
  Buch et al. (2010) focus on FDI and explore country differences in contractual enforcement.  
8
  Hence, we focus on the case of horizontal FDI, which is the dominant form of FDI for German firms. 
9
  This reflects the broadest and also most precise definition of financial constraints as put forward e.g. by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and by Hall and Lerner (2010). 
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it needs to recur to external finance, which implies that all costs are multiplied by a factor 
of .1J ! 10 We will use the parameter q as a measure for the firm-specific financial 
constraint, i.e. the higher q, the more likely it is that the firm is financially constrained 
and hence the larger the expected cost of market entry. The parameter  can capture both 
firm-specific or sector-specific characteristics, for example the collateralizability of a 
firm’s assets which may vary across firms, but also across sectors in general. The less 
collateralizable the assets are, the higher the cost of external finance is expected to be and 
thus the higher . Note that we do not make any assumptions about how this financial 
constraint could be related to the firm’s productivity. We will discuss below how our 
results would be affected if we allowed for some negative correlation between firm 
productivity and financial constraints. 
J
J
The firm competes in the foreign market in a Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition 
environment. Consumers have a preference for variety and maximize their utility for a 
given total expenditure of  E. The utility function of a representative consumer is  
   11U s( ) d
V
VV
V
Z:
§ · Z Z
©¨ ¹³ ¸  (1) 
where : represents the mass of available goods and 1!V  is the elasticity of substitution. 
Maximizing the representative consumer’s utility, we can derive the demand function for 
the firm offering variety Z as  
 
j
j j 1
Ep
s(p ,P) s
P
V
V{   (2) 
where  is the price charged by the firm and P is the overall price index, with 
. In slight abuse of notation, we let  denote the demand the firm 
faces when charging price  for the respective export or FDI regime. 
jp
,FDj X I js js(p ,P)
jp
                                                 
10
  An alternative way to model financial constraints would be to model explicitly the internal funds 
available for (partially) financing foreign expansion and to let the size of internal funds quantify the 
severity of financial constraints. The results would be qualitatively the same. Our version, however, 
greatly simplifies notation.  
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In choosing between exports and FDI, firms have to consider iceberg transportation costs 
which reduce revenues from exporting by a factor X 1W  W !# . In the case of FDI, there are 
no transportation costs, i.e. . Thus, profits are given by: FDI 1W  
 
j j
j
j
p s c
s Fj jS   W E  (3) 
if the firm has sufficient internal funds available to finance market entry and production 
cost, and 
 
j j j
j
j
p s cs
F
§ ·S   J ¨W E© ¹j ¸
 (4) 
if the firm needs to finance entry and production cost with external funds. 
 
Firms set prices to maximize profits. Consider the case where the firm needs external 
finance. The first order condition that follows from (4) is given by: 
 
j j j j
j j j j
d s p dsc 0
dp dp
§ ·S J    ¨ ¸¨ ¸W W E© ¹
 (5) 
From (2) we can derive: 
 
1
j j
1
j
ds Ep
dp P
V
V V  (6) 
using the fact that the price index does not change if  a single firm changes its price, due 
to the continuum of firms. Plugging (2) and (6) into (5), we can solve for the optimal 
price charged by a given firm: 
 
j
j
c
p
1
J W V E V  (7) 
Now, using (7) and (2), we can determine the optimal quantity sold abroad (the intensive 
margin) as: 
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j
j 1
cE
s
P 1
V
V
J W§ V ¨ E V © ¹
·¸
 (8) 
and, using (7) and (8), total profits can be written as:  
 
1
j
j j
cE F
P 1
VJ W§ ·V  J¨ ¸V E V© ¹
 (9) S
In a similar way we can solve for the case where the firm uses internal financing, simply 
dropping the parameter  in the equations above. J
 
2.1 Extensive Margins 
Consider now the decision of the firm whether or not to expand abroad and if so, whether 
to do so via exports of via FDI. The expected profits of market entry in the case of 
exports and FDI are given by: 
 
1 1
X X
E c E cE( ) q F (1 q) F
P 1 P 1
V Vª º ª§ · § ·J W V W VS   J   « » «¨ ¸ ¨ ¸V E V V E V« » «© ¹ © ¹¬ ¼ ¬
# #
X
º»»¼
 (10) 
and 
1 1
FDI FDI FDI
E c E cE( ) q F (1 q) F
P 1 P 1
V Vª º ª§ · § ·J V VS   J   « » «¨ ¸ ¨ ¸V E V  V E V« » «© ¹ © ¹¬ ¼ ¬
º»»¼
 (11) 
respectively.  
Rearranging and comparing the payoffs in equations (10) and (11), we can now 
determine three critical productivity cutoffs, (i) the critical productivity such that the 
investor breaks even if he opts for exporting, XˆE , (ii) the critical productivity such that the 
investor breaks even if he opts for FDI, FDˆ IE , and (iii) the critical productivity such that 
the investor prefers FDI over exporting, E : FDIˆ X!
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(i) 
1
1 1 1
(1 ) 1
X X
E c
ˆ [q (1 q)]F [q (1 q)]
P 1
 V V
V ª ºW V§ · § ·E t J   J  « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸V V© ¹ © ¹« »¬ ¼
#
 
In the Appendix, we show that X X X X
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆd d d d0; 0; 0; 0
dF d dq d
E E E E! ! t tW J# . 
Thus, we reproduce the well known result that the critical productivity cutoff increases in 
fixed costs and in the iceberg transportation cost. Furthermore, a greater dependence on 
and higher cost of external finance decrease the expected profitability of exports. Thus, 
the firm needs a higher productivity to break even. 
We find similar results for the critical productivity cutoff for FDI: 
(ii) 
1
1 1 1
(1 ) 1
FDI FDI
E c
ˆ [q (1 q)]F [q (1 q)]
P 1
 V V
V ª ºV§ · § ·E t J   J  « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸V V© ¹ © ¹« »¬ ¼
 
In the Appendix, we show that X X X
FDI
ˆ ˆ ˆd d d0; 0; 0
dF dq d
E E E! t tJ . 
In both cases, there are two groups of firms that are not affected in their 
internationalization decision by financial constraints. The first group of firms are those 
that are not productive enough to profitably expand even without financial constraints, 
i.e. q = 0, and hence never even considered expansion i.e. firms with a productivity below 
. The second group of firms are those that are so productive that even for q = 1 they 
would still engage in foreign expansion, i.e. their productivity is above  . This is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Interestingly, we find these threshold effects even without making 
any assumptions about larger firms being less affected by financial constraints than small 
firms. These threshold effects would hold a fortiori if the internal funds were assumed to 
be positively related to the firm’s productivity.
i q 0
ˆ |  E
i q 1
ˆ |  E
11
  
                                                 
11
  See also Chaney (2005) who finds a similar relationship, arguing explicitly that more productive firms 
may have more internal funds available from domestic revenues. 
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if
ifJ
i q 0
ˆ |  E i q 1ˆ |  E
never invest always invest
E
iS
i( | q 0)S E  
i( | q 1)S E  
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Figure 1 
Finally, we investigate the critical productivity cutoff that makes FDI more lucrative than 
exporting. 
(iii) 
1
1 1 1
1 1 (1 ) 1
FDI X FDI x
E c
ˆ [q (1 q)](F F ) (1 ) [q (1 q)]
P 1
 V V
V  V 
!
ª ºV§ · § ·E t J     W J  « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸V V© ¹ © ¹« »¬ ¼
#
 
In the Appendix, we show that 
FDI X FDI X FDI X FDI X
FDI X
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆd d d d0; 0; 0; 0
d(F F ) d dq d
! ! !E E E E!  t t W J#
!
. 
As expected, higher iceberg costs favor FDI and higher fixed costs for FDI relative to 
exporting favors exporting. In addition, the tighter financial constraints, the less likely it 
is that the firm will prefer FDI over exporting. The reason is that exports imply lower 
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fixed costs and a lower scale of production, due to the iceberg costs. Hence, tighter 
financial constraints have a stronger impact on FDI than on exports. 
 
2.2 Intensive Margins 
Consider next the intensive margin. At the time production resumes, uncertainty about 
financing needs is resolved. If the firm finances its production cost with external funds, it 
faces production costs that are higher by a factor of . Thus, optimal quantities are 
decreasing in : 
J
J
 X FDI1 1
E c E c
s and s
P 1 P 1
V 
V V
§ · §J W V J V  ¨ ¸ ¨E V E V© ¹ ©
V·¸
¹  (12) 
Furthermore, we can compare the relative impact of financial constraints on the intensive 
margin by studying the difference in quantities, XFDIs ss  ' : 
 
 
s 1 1
1
( )
E c E c
P 1 P 1
E c1
P 1
V 
V V
V
V
V

Vª º§ · § ·J V J W V'   « »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸E V E V« »© ¹ © ¹¬ ¼
§ ·J V  W ¨ ¸E V © ¹
#
#'*(*)
 (13) 
The difference decreases in , i.e. J d s 0
d
' J , as 1 0
V W !#  given that . Intuitively, 
this is because the marginal costs of exporting are higher than the marginal costs of FDI 
due to the presence of iceberg transportation costs.  
1V !
2.3 Theoretical Hypotheses  
The comparative static results for adjustments along the extensive margin, which hold for 
FDI and for exports as shown in (14) and (15), can be summarized as follows:  
H1. The higher the productivity of the project (E ), the higher are expected profits and 
thus the probability to engage in exports or FDI. This effect is expected to be 
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stronger for FDI than for exports, i.e. the higher the productivity, the more likely 
it is that FDI is preferred over exporting.   
H2. The higher the fixed costs of the project (F), the lower are expected profits and 
thus the less likely it is that the firm engages in exports or FDI.   
H3. The more severe financial constraints are in the sense that the firm is forced to 
recur to external finance, the lower are expected profits and hence the less likely 
it is that the firm engages in exports or FDI. This effect is expected to be stronger 
for FDI than for exporting.  
H4. The higher the cost of external finance, e.g. due to low potential of 
collateralization, the lower are expected profits, and hence the less likely it is that 
the firm engages in exports or FDI. This effect is expected to be stronger for FDI 
than for exporting.  
H5. Financial constraints do not affect the entry decision of very low productivity or 
very high productivity firms. 
We will test these hypotheses by analyzing the impact of these variables on the (relative) 
probability to engage in FDI or exports (Section 4.2); details on the measurement of the 
relevant variables are given in Section 3. 
Similarly, the comparative static results for the intensive margins of FDI and exports as 
given in (17) show that: 
H6. The higher the productivity of the project (E ) is, the higher are expected exports 
or affiliate sales.  
H7. The higher the cost of external finance is (higher J ), the lower are expected 
exports or affiliate sales. The impact is expected to be stronger for affiliate sales 
than for export volumes.  
Hypotheses (6) and (7) will be tested by analyzing the impact of these variables on the 
volume of exports or affiliate sales (Section 4.3). 
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics12 
Our main testing equation relates financial constraints and productivity to the pattern of 
internationalization at the firm level. We are interested in two questions. Do financial 
constraints and efficiency affect the probability of investing abroad or of becoming 
exporters, i.e. the extensive margin? And what is the impact of these variables on the 
intensive margin, i.e. the volume of exports or affiliate sales? We answer these questions 
in an empirical model which captures both margins for FDI and exports simultaneously. 
In this section, we describe the data that we use to model these choices empirically before 
turning to our analysis of firms’ actual internationalization choices in Section 4.  
3.1 Balance Sheets and Multinational Status 
Our main data source is Dafne,13 the largest available database providing financial 
information on firms that are active in Germany. The dataset is assembled by 
Creditreform, the largest German credit rating agency, and distributed by the Bureau van 
Dijk. We use an unbalanced panel covering a maximum of 5 years (2002-2006). The 
average time string for individuals is relatively short (about two and a half years), which 
implies that we essentially exploit the cross-section variation in the data. This precludes 
estimating dynamic models of investment behavior such as Euler equation models.  
We can identify firms that hold 10% or more of the equity capital in foreign firms and 
firms that export. The majority of all firms are purely domestic firms, i.e. they neither 
export nor maintain affiliates abroad (85.7% of the firm-year observations).14 The 
number of firms that export (7.3%) and of firms with foreign affiliates (5.6%) is 
similar.15 However, some firms are both exporters and FDI firms at the same time.  
                                                 
12
  See the Appendix for details. 
13
  Dafne is the German part of the European firm-level database Amadeus.  
14
  Since we have no time-varying ownership and export information in Dafne, we use information on 
firms’ status for the most recent year. Due to the relatively short sample period, this is unlikely to bias 
our results. Furthermore we adjust this information using data from MiDi. 
15
   The  share of exporting firms in the population of all German firms is at about 12 percent (Institut für 
Mittelstandsforschung 2006). 
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Our dataset includes manufacturing as well as service sector firms (see Table 2 in the 
Appendix). Table 3b in the Appendix shows the share of manufacturing and service firms 
that are active abroad and their mode of entry in the foreign market. In the full sample, 
service firms account for 65% of all firms, but they account for 55% of the FDI firms and 
30% of the export firms. About three quarters of the FDI firms, predominantly services 
sector firms, are pure FDI firms, i.e. they have foreign affiliates but do not report any 
exports. The remainder, mostly manufacturing firms, have foreign affiliates and export. 
One possible explanation is that many services are non-tradable, hence foreign sales 
require a physical presence. For this reason, we do not impose a particular hierarchy on 
foreign entry modes (as in an ordered probit model, for instance). Instead, we let the data 
speak and estimate firms’ choices to engage in exports and FDI in two separate equations 
which we allow to be correlated via both observed and unobserved characteristics of 
firms.  
We define dummy variables for the sub-groups of firms to capture the extensive margin 
of firms’ foreign activities. An exporter dummy which is equal to one if a firm engages in 
exports and zero otherwise (irrespective of whether the firm also engages in FDI, 4,486 
firms). Similarly, we define an FDI dummy which is equal to one if a firm engages in 
FDI and zero otherwise (irrespective of whether the firm also exports, 3,963 firms).  
The intensive margin for exports is specified by multiplying the export share in total sales 
with the total sales of a given firm. To obtain information on foreign affiliates’ sales we 
combine the Dafne database with the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Micro-Database Foreign 
Direct Investment (MiDi). Our dataset is unique in the sense that it contains information 
on FDI and exports for the intensive and the extensive margin.  
To eliminate outliers, we start from the full Dafne dataset and drop firms with negative 
values for key variables such as sales and total assets. Also, as we need information on 
cash flow and sales, we eliminate observations for firms which do not file an income 
statement. We additionally truncate some of the data at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Finally, we drop observations showing large changes in total assets, sales or in the 
number of employees from one year to another (increase by a factor of 10 or drop to 1/10 
or less) in order to control for possible merger-induced outliers (Table 1 in the 
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Appendix). Further, as firms active in public administration cannot enter foreign markets, 
we do not consider these firms in our analysis. Table 4 in the Appendix compares the 
structure of the sample after outlier correction (“corrected sample”) and the sample used 
for the regressions (“regression sample”). The two samples are fairly similar in terms of 
the percentage allocation of the number of firms across sectors. We have also compared 
the structure of our sample to the sectoral structure of the German economy as a whole, 
and the rank correlation in terms of sectoral structure of sales has proven to be quite high.  
3.2 Financial Constraints and Productivity 
In this section, we discuss how we measure the key variables from our theoretical model 
– productivity and financial constraints. In Figures 2a-d, we also visualize the differences 
between exporters, FDI firms, and domestic firms by plotting the Kernel densities of size, 
the fixed asset share, cash flow, the debt ratio, and cost efficiency. Additional descriptive 
statistics are given in Table 3 in the Appendix.  
 
Figure 2: Firm Characteristics by Multinational Status 
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Productivity (E): We include the size of the firm as a measure for its productivity, and the 
expected sign is positive. In line with the theoretical model, we additionally use cost 
efficiency as a firm-level measure of productivity. Cost efficiency is given by sales over 
total costs, i.e. labor costs plus the costs of other inputs. A higher value reflects higher 
cost efficiency, hence we expect a positive sign.16 Figure 2 confirms stylized facts 
reported in earlier papers using firm-level data: Domestic firms are the smallest, followed 
by exporters and FDI firms. Unreported one-sided t-tests on equality of the means 
between the sub-samples show that this difference is statistically significant. 
Our dataset does not allow using more structural measures of productivity such as the 
methods developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (LP, 2003). 
These measures rely on the availability of information on (firm-level) intermediate inputs 
(for the LP-measure), and they require information about economic exit, but this type of 
information is not included in our data. Also, because of financial constraints, investment 
might no longer be strictly increasing in the productivity shock, which would violate a 
key assumption underlying the method by Olley and Pakes (1996).  
Fixed costs (F): The firm’s fixed costs of investment are proxied by the ratio of fixed 
assets over total assets, and we expect a negative impact of the fixed asset share. We use 
the ratio rather than the level of fixed assets as we additionally account for size effects in 
our regressions. In previous work using sectoral data, the ratio of fixed over total assets 
has also been used as a proxy for the availability of collateral (see, e.g., Manova 2010). 
Following this interpretation, the expected sign would be positive as a greater availability 
of collateral would lower the costs of external finance. Our results suggest that the 
interpretation of the fixed asset share in terms of fixed costs is more in line with the 
evidence.  
Strictly speaking, this variable is more appropriate to measure the fixed investment costs 
in the context of FDI than in the context of exporting. For exports, country specific costs 
                                                 
16
  Higher sales relative to total costs might also reflect higher mark-ups. The expected sign of the 
coefficient would be the same. 
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of marketing or setting up a distribution network may be more relevant. Since our data 
does not allow us to identify the destination of the exports, we cannot include such 
country specific fixed costs of starting exporting. Thus, we include the same variable in 
both the FDI and the exporting regressions for comparability reasons, but we interpret it 
with caution in the exporting case. 
Internal funds (q): In our theoretical model, the availability of internal funds is a key 
determinant of financial constraints as it determines the likelihood q that external finance 
is needed. Log cash flow of the parent is used to measure the internal funds available for 
financing a particular investment project. A similar measure for internal funds is used in 
Berman and Héricourt (2010) (cash flow / total assets). Also, Manova (2010) uses a 
sector-level measure for external finance dependence which is defined as the share of 
investment not financed from internal cash flow. Cash flow should have a positive impact 
for the extensive margin of foreign activities. However, as we stated in Hypothesis 5, we 
do not expect this effect for very small firms but only for firms exceeding a critical 
productivity threshold. For the very large and very productive firms, the impact of 
financial constraints should again level off. The higher cash flow, the more likely it is that 
the firm is able to finance its production internally. Thus, cash flow should have a 
positive impact on the intensive margin as well. Figure 2c shows that cash flow is indeed 
significant higher for exporters and FDI firms. The purely domestic firms have the 
smallest cash flow, followed by exporters and FDI firms.  
Cost of external finance (J): The debt ratio measures leverage ex ante. We can interpret 
the debt ratio as a measure of the firms’ cost of external finance – firms that are more 
highly leveraged have, ceteris paribus, fewer assets available that can serve as collateral 
for new credits, have a smaller borrowing capacity, and find it more costly to raise 
additional external finance. Hence, the expected sign for the debt ratio is negative.17 This 
measure is used in most articles on financial constraints and firm’s international 
activities, as e.g. in Berman and Héricourt (2010). Greenaway et al. (2007) use short term 
                                                 
17
  Note that firms may also report a high debt ratio precisely because they have borrowed funds in order 
to finance FDI or exports. If this were the correct interpretation, we should expect a positive sign of the 
coefficient. Our results below do not support this latter interpretation. 
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debt/ total assets. Consistent with expectations, FDI firms are those with the lowest debt 
ratios (Figure 2d). 
Taken together, these observations suggest that size (and thus productivity) as well as 
financial factors play a role in determining foreign status. Prima facie, Figures 2a-d also 
suggest that heterogeneity with regard to the openness and international orientation of 
firms could be driven just as much by financial factors as by real factors and productivity. 
In the following, we will analyze these patterns in the data more systematically. 
4 Productivity versus Financial Constraints: Regression Results 
4.1 Extensive Margin 
We analyze the extensive margin using both a linear probability model and a bivariate 
probit model for the probability of engaging in FDI or exporting. The advantage of the 
linear probability model lies in the ease of interpretation. This is why we start by 
presenting the results from the linear model. This ease of interpretation comes at the cost 
that we have to assume that marginal effects are constant for all firms in our sample. One 
further disadvantage is that the linear probability model predicts probabilities that lie 
outside the range of zero and one. Thus, we also present results from a bivariate probit 
model. As we will see the results from both models are consistent with each other. 
We assume that there are two latent variables, the propensity of firm i to engage in 
exporting and the propensity to engage in FDI: 
  (14) X,i,t 10 11 i,t 1 12 i,t 1 X,i,ty productivity finance  D D D  H
  (15) FDI,i,t 20 21 i,t 1 22 i,t 1 FDI,i,ty productivity finance  D D D  H
We use cost efficiency and firm size as proxies for productivity ( ) and the 
fixed asset share as a proxy for the fixed costs of investment. Cash flow and the debt ratio 
capture financial constraints (
i,t 1productivity 
i,t 1finance  ). We estimate equations (14) and (15) using a 
full set of sector, region, and year fixed effects. Regressors are lagged by one period to 
account for the potential simultaneity of the explanatory variables. 
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We will observe  
X,i,t
i,t
X,i,t
1 if y 0 (Firm i exports in period t.)
X
0 if y 0 (Firm i does not export in period t.)
!­° ® d°¯  
and 
FDI,i,t
i,t
FDI,i,t
1 if y 0 (Firm i invests abroad in period t.)
FDI
0 if y 0 (Firm i does not invest abroad in period t.)
!­° ® d°¯  
There might be unobserved factors that influence both the decision to export and the 
decision to engage in FDI, which places the model in the context of seemingly unrelated 
regressions. In the linear probability model, there is no efficiency gain through the joint 
estimation of the export and FDI decision as the same set of covariates is used in both 
regressions. When we estimate a nonlinear model in the form of a bivariate probit, 
however, estimation is more efficient if we estimate both equations jointly, at least if the 
decisions of engaging in exporting and FDI are indeed correlated. 
4.1.1 Linear Probability Model 
Table 5 shows the results using a 0/1 dummy of being an exporter and of owning foreign 
affiliates as the dependent variables. Columns (1) and (2) have the baseline specification 
for the full regression sample. In colums (3)-(14), we split by sector (manufacturing 
versus services) and firm size, and we include specifications with interaction terms.  
 
 
Table 5: Extensive Margin: Linear Probability Model 
This table reports marginal effects of a linear probability regressions using a 0/1 dummy variable of being an exporter and of being a multinational firm as the 
dependent variable. A full set of time, region, and sector  dummies is included. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  Full Sample Manufacturing Services Small Large Third Quartile Fourth Quartile 
  
Exporter 
 (0/1) 
FDI firm 
 (0/1) 
Exporter 
(0/1) 
FDI firm
 (0/1) 
Exporter 
(0/1) 
FDI firm 
(0/1) 
Exporter
 (0/1) 
FDI firm 
(0/1) 
Exporter 
(0/1) 
FDI firm 
(0/1) 
Exporter 
(0/1) 
FDI firm
 (0/1) 
Exporter
 (0/1) 
FDI firm 
(0/1) 
Log size (t-1) 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.057*** 0.071*** 0.004*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.004*** 0.007** 0.063*** 0.015 0.022*** -0.010 0.034***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
Cost efficiency (t-1) -0.001 0.018*** -0.033** 0.037*** 0.002 0.014*** 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.017*** 0.001 0.014** -0.006 0.022**
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
Log cash flow (t-1) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008 0.003 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.002 0.001* 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.009** 0.001 0.008** 0.016***
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.038***-0.048***-0.076*** -0.033** -0.012* -0.042***-0.020*** -0.002 -0.046***-0.069*** -0.016 -0.027** -0.100*** -0.058**
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.020) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.021) (0.023) 
Fixed asset share (t-1) -0.067***-0.167*** -0.009 -0.156***-0.059***-0.161***-0.036***-0.013***-0.044***-0.240***-0.044***-0.108*** -0.026** -0.312***
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.024) (0.016) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) 
Log cash flow (t-1)*large           -0.003 0.006*** -0.001 0.008***
           (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Debt ratio (t-1)*large           0.039* -0.021 0.022 -0.052 
           (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) (0.033) 
const -0.182***-0.236*** -0.297** -0.536*** -0.037 -0.099** -0.085** -0.041*** -0.037 -0.501*** -0.084 -0.041 -0.001 -0.677***
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.120) (0.107) (0.024) (0.042) (0.036) (0.006) (0.041) (0.054) (0.110) (0.113) (0.087) (0.114) 
                              
Observations 69,701 69,701 18,611 18,611 39,246 39,246 34,684 34,684 35,017 35,017 17,497 17,497 17,520 17,520 
R² 0.154 0.147 0.120 0.207 0.042 0.104 0.066 0.011 0.191 0.158 0.142 0.050 0.256 0.197 
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Full Sample: FDI versus Exports 
Starting with the full sample, we find that larger and more cost efficient firms are more 
likely to expand abroad, confirming Hypothesis 1. As expected, size and cost efficiency 
matters more for the decision to engage in FDI than for the decision to export. The fixed 
asset share as a measure for the fixed costs of market entry in case of FDI has the 
expected negative sign that is predicted by Hypothesis 2. It also has a negative impact of 
the likelihood of exporting. One plausible interpretation is that higher fixed costs of 
production, even if production takes place at home, leave lower internal funds for 
production.  
Firms with higher cash flows and lower debt ratios are more likely to invest abroad, 
confirming Hypothesis 3. As expected, we find that both measures of financial 
constraints matter more for FDI than for exports. These effects are also economically 
significant: if the debt ratio increases by one standard deviation, both the probability of 
exporting and the probability of engaging in FDI increase by 1 percentage point or 15 and 
26 percent of its mean value, respectively. If the (logarithm of) a firm’s cash flow 
increases by one standard deviation, both the probability to engage in exporting and FDI 
increase by 2 percentage points which represents 31 and 39 percent of its mean value, 
respectively.  
 
Manufacturing versus Services 
Studying the manufacturing and service firms separately (Columns 3-4 versus 5-6) 
suggests that service firms are much more heterogeneous than manufacturing firms, 
judging from the much higher R² we find for the manufacturing sample. In both 
subsamples, our measures for financial constraints have the expected impact. The effect 
is typically larger in the service industries. One plausible interpretation is that 
investments in service industries are more difficult to collateralize and hence access to 
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external finance is more costly.18 This interpretation would be in line with Hypothesis 4, 
which predicts are stronger impact of financial constraints if external finance is more 
costly. 
 
Small versus Large Firms 
Next, we are interested in whether financial constraints affect large and small firms 
differently (Columns 7-8 versus 9-10). As summarized in Hypothesis 5, we expect 
financial constraints to matter only above a critical threshold of productivity. Firms with 
a very low productivity and thus small firms are less likely to engage in foreign activity 
in the first place, hence financial constraints are less relevant a priori for these firms. 
Hypothesis 5 also states that, above a certain threshold of productivity, firms may not be 
affected in their entry decision anymore since they are able to shoulder the cost of market 
entry even if it needs to be financed with costly external finance alone.  
We capture differences in productivity by differences in firm size and start by 
investigating a sample split along the median. Interestingly, both cash flow and debt ratio 
have no impact on the FDI entry decision for small firms. We find a small effect of the 
debt ratio in case of the exporting decision. This suggests that the critical productivity 
level and hence the critical firm size is smaller for exporting to become profitable. Thus, 
in case of exporting, we expect the impact of financial constraints to kick in at a smaller 
firm size already. 
Financial constraints have the expected significant effects for large firms though. To test 
whether this negative impact of financial constraints tapers off for the very large firms, 
we look at the largest two quartiles separately (Columns 11-14). Interestingly, the 
negative effects of financial constraints are still strong in the top quartile. To check 
whether, perhaps within the top quartiles, the impact of financial constraints levels off, 
we additionally include interaction terms between our explanatory variables and a 
dummy for large firms. For the FDI decision, the results from the fourth quartile suggest 
                                                 
18
  Note that standard datasets on differences in financial constraints across different industries (see, e.g., 
Rajan and Zingales 1998) typically focus on manufacturing firms. 
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that larger firms are still more strongly affected. This is no longer the case for exporting, 
though, were the size effect indeed seems to taper off in the top quartile. 
4.1.2 Bivariate Probit 
Next, we analyze the probability to engage in exporting and the probability to engage in 
FDI using a bivariate probit model in order to capture the discrete nature of our 
dependent variable. We specify a joint distribution for exporting and FDI, thus explicitely 
taking into account  model allows us to take into account the correlation between these 
decisions. 
We assume that the error terms X,i,tH  and FDI,i,tH  from equations (14) and (15) follow a 
bivariate probit distribution with X,i,t FDI,i,t ) 0E( ) E(H  H  , X,i,t FDI,i,tVar( ) Var( ) 1H  H  , 
and . The joint probabilities of exporting and investing abroad can be 
expressed as:  
X,i,t FDI,i,tcov( , )H H  U
U
1
it X i,t FDI X 1 1 FDI 2 2Pr(X k ,FDI k ) (q x ' ,q x ' , )   ) D D   
where if and if jq 1 jk  jq 1  jk 0 for j X,FDI . If the errors are uncorrelated 
( 0 U ), then the bivariate probit model collapses into two separate probit models. The 
correlation between export and FDI status, as measured by U , is positive and significant, 
indicating that the decisions to engage in FDI and in exports should be analyzed jointly.  
Table 6 shows the results of the bivarite probit regressions using a 0/1 dummy of being 
an exporter and of owning foreign affiliates as the dependent variables. Regarding 
marginal effects at the sample mean, the results are qualitatively the same as in the linear 
probability model: Larger and more cost efficient firms are more likely to invest abroad 
(The marginal effect for cost efficiency in the export regression is unexpectedly negative, 
a result which is driven by the manufacturing firms.) Less financially constrained firms 
are more likely to invest abroad.  
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Table 6: Extensive Margin: Bivariate Probit Models 
This table reports marginal effects of bivaritate of probit regressions using a 0/1 dummy variable of being 
an exporter and of being a multinational firm as the dependent variable. A full set of time, region, and 
sector dummies is included. Marginal effects at the means of the independent variables on the univariate 
(marginal) probability of success are reported. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
  (1) (2) 
 Exports (0/1) FDI firm (0/1) 
Log size (t-1) 0.005*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Cost efficiency (t-1) -0.025*** 0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Log cash flow (t-1) 0.020*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.009 -0.009*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) 
Fixed asset share (t-1) -0.116*** -0.085*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) 
Observations 69,701 69,701 
Number of clusters 38,370 38,370 
Log likelihood -31,847 -31,847 U  0.327 0.327 
 
We argued earlier on that it is an advantage of nonlinear models to allow for 
heterogeneous marginal effects. Interpreting interaction effects in nonlinear models, 
however, is problematic. As shown in more detail in the technical appendix, the simple 
interaction term between any of the explanatory variables and a dummy for large firms 
may not be informative with regard to the sign and the significance of the true interaction 
effect. We thus use the methodology suggested by Ai and Norton (2003) to compute the 
correct interaction effects for each firm,19 and we plot these against the predicted 
probability of engaging in FDI (exporting). Figures 3-4 give the results. The estimated 
coefficients are significant if they lie outside the confidence interval indicated by the 
solid lines.  
                                                 
19
  We use the Stata code inteff. See Norton et al. (2004).  
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Figure 3: Interaction Effects Between Cash Flow and Firm Size 
This Figure shows the interaction terms between cash flow and a 0/1 dummy for large firms following Ai and Norton (2003) and using the code inteff in Stata. 
We define large firms as those with assets above the 90% decile and small and mid-sized firms as all others. 
 
This figure shows the interaction terms between the debt ratio and a 0/1 dummy for large firms following Ai and Norton (2003) and using the code inteff in Stata. 
We define large firms as those with assets above the 90% decile and small and mid-sized firms as all others. 
 
Figure 4: Interaction Effects Between the Debt Ratio and Firm Size 
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We have also interacted cash flow with the dummy for large firms. Results show a negative 
and significant impact on exports. The impact on FDI is negative as well, but it is significant 
only for very small probabilities of engaging in FDI. Recall that, in the baseline regression, 
cash flow is positive and significant. Finding a negative interaction effect thus implies that 
cash flow constraints are less binding for large firms. This seems to confirm our prediction 
that the financial constraint tapers off for large firms. 
Financial constraints in the form of a high debt ratio have a negative and significant impact 
for the export decision of large firms (Figure 3). Moreover, the negative impact of the debt 
ratio becomes significant only if the probability of exporting becomes sufficiently large. This 
is in line with the idea that there is a threshold effect, i.e. financial constraints do not matter 
for firms too small and/or too unproductive to consider foreign expansion. Small and large 
firms do not differ, in contrast, as regards the negative impact of the debt ratio on FDI status.  
All in all, the results of this section support the predictions of the theoretical model in the 
sense that real and financial frictions affect the internationalization decisions of firms and 
that this effect depends on firm size.  
4.2 Intensive Margin 
Based on the results obtained from estimating equations (14) and (15), we estimate the 
intensive margin of firms’ foreign activities as: 
      (16)
  (17) 
X
i,t 10 11 i,t 1 12 i,t 1 13 i,t 1 i,tExports productivity finance Mills  E E E E  H
FDI
i,t 20 21 i,t 1 22 i,t 1 23 i,tAffiliate sales productivity finance Mills  E E E E

1 i,t H
where  ( ) is the inverse Mills ratio based on the first-stage regression 
capturing the selection into exporting (FDI). Equations 
X
i,t 1Mills 
FDI
i,t 1Mills 
(16) and (17) are estimated using 
OLS with time and sector fixed effects. We use regional dummies as exclusion restrictions. 
This accounts for the fact that East Germany is less integrated internationally in terms of 
trade and FDI than West Germany, one reason being the small size and low productivity of 
East German firms and the fact that few headquarters of multinational firms are located in 
the East (see, e.g., Buch and Toubal 2009, Carlin 2010, Paqué 2009). 
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Does selection into exporting and FDI affect the intensive margin, i.e. the volume of exports 
and affiliate sales? The answer to this question depends on whether proxies for financial 
constraints are included in the regression (Table 7). Including measures for financial 
frictions, the Mills ratio accounting for the selection into export and FDI status is 
insignificant (Columns 1 and 3). Excluding the debt ratio and cash flow (Columns 2 and 4) 
yields a significant coefficient for the Mills ratio for exports and affiliate sales. Estimates of 
the intensive margin which ignore the selection into exports and FDI and the fact that 
financial frictions matter for selection thus suffer from an omitted variables bias. 
 
Table 7: Intensive Margin 
The dependent variable is the log volume of exports and of affiliate sales. OLS regressions with robust standard 
errors. The Mills ratio is obtained from the first-stage bivariate probit regressions reported in Table 6. Time and 
sector fixed effects are included. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Log exports Log exports  Log affiliate  Log affiliate  
      sales sales 
Log size t-1  0.933*** 1.019*** 0.658*** 0.475*** 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.082) (0.071) 
Cost efficiency t-1  -0.534*** -0.396*** -0.626*** -0.631*** 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.136) (0.129) 
Log cash flow t-1  0.162***  0.139**  
 (0.038)  (0.059)  
Debt ratio t-1  0.124  -0.455***  
 (0.103)  (0.166)  
Fixed asset share t-1  -1.367*** -0.742*** -1.694*** -0.348 
 (0.207) (0.163) (0.556) (0.338) 
Mills ratio -0.006 0.541*** -0.485 0.496** 
 (0.204) (0.153) (0.349) (0.213) 
Constant 0.140 0.818* 1.776 6.313*** 
 (0.568) (0.482) (1.569) (1.040) 
Observations 2,398 2,398 1,620 1,620 
R² 0.729 0.714 0.316 0.279 
log likelihood -3,560 -3,627 -2,478 -2,521 
 
 
As before, size has a strong impact on foreign activities of firms, confirming Hypothesis 6. 
The elasticity of exports with regard to size is close to one (0.93); the size elasticity of 
affiliate sales is a bit smaller (0.71). For exports and for affiliate sales, we now find a 
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negative and significant impact of cost efficiency. Given that firms are already active abroad, 
higher cost efficiency does thus not translate into higher sales. For the fixed asset share, we 
find the expected negative sign for both exports (-1.36) and affiliate sales (-1.56), suggesting 
that higher fixed costs lower profits and the volume of activity. Taken together, these results 
support that productivity and fixed costs affect foreign activity. 
Turning next to results for financial frictions, we find a similar positive effect of cash flow 
(0.16 for exports, 0.10 for affiliate sales). The debt ratio is negative and significant for  FDI 
(-0.51) but insignificant for exports. This is consistent with Hypothesis 7 that financial 
constraints should matter more for FDI due to the larger volume of production. 
5 Conclusions 
Recent literature on the foreign activities of firms stresses the importance of low productivity 
as a barrier to international integration. Yet, other barriers and factor market frictions might 
be important as well. In this paper, we explore whether financial constraints have an impact 
on the choice between exports and FDI using data for German firms. We distinguish 
adjustment along the extensive and the intensive margins. We distinguish manufacturing and 
service sector firms, and we analyze whether there are threshold effects that depend on firm 
size.  
Our paper has three main findings: 
First, financial frictions – measured through a firm’s debt ratio or leverage – are more 
important for FDI than for exports. This holds for the extensive and for the intensive margin, 
and it is in line with our theoretical prior, as FDI requires larger fixed costs and is associated 
with a larger scale of production. Moreover, financial constraints affect the selection into 
FDI and export status. Empirical models of the intensive margin not accounting for financial 
frictions and/or the selection into foreign status would thus suffer from an omitted variables 
bias. 
Second, firms in service industries are more affected in their internationalization strategies 
by financial constraints than firms in manufacturing. According to our theoretical model, this 
could be the case because transportation costs are higher for services than for manufacturing 
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firms, thus requiring a physical presence abroad. An alternative explanation would be that 
service sector firms have fewer assets that can serve as collateral. 
Third, from a theoretical point of view, we expect financial constraints to matter most for 
firms of an intermediate size and productivity. Very small firms are unlikely to invest abroad 
in the first place; very large firms are sufficiently productive to be able to shoulder the cost 
of foreign expansions even if external funds are costly. In fact, empirically, financial 
constraints do not seem to be relevant for small firms. For very large firms we see some 
tapering off of the impact of financial constraints for the exporting decision.  
While we do not directly test the impact of policy measures aimed at improving firms’ 
access to foreign markets, our results yet hold potential implications for economic policy. 
Models stressing (low) productivity as a barrier for entry into foreign markets and exports 
indicate that improvements in efficiency would stimulate foreign activities of firms. Our 
results suggest that reforms aimed at improving access of firms to external finance might be 
equally important. 
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7 Technical Appendix: Interaction Terms 
 
Assume the following non-linear model as in equation (1) of Ai and Norton (2003): 
   1 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2E y x , x ,X x x x x Xª º  ) E E E  E  ) ¬ ¼ .   (A.1) 
where )  is the standard normal distribution. If  and  are continuous variables, the 
interaction effect is the cross-derivative of y which is given by 
1x 2x
        2 12 1 12 2 2 12 1
1 2
' x x
x x
w )   E )   E E E E ) w w '' .    (A.2) 
This equation shows that the true marginal effect of the interaction term is not given by 
 )'12E . Instead, equation (A.2) has the following implications: 
(i) The interaction effect can be non-zero even if 012  E . 
(ii) The statistical significance of the interaction term cannot be tested on 12E  using the t-
statistics. 
(iii) The interaction effect is conditional on the explanatory variables. 
(iv) The interaction effect may have different signs for different values of the explanatory 
variables. 
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8  Mathematical Appendix 
Consider first the critical threshold for export to be profitable. 
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From this we can derive the comparative static results as follows 
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Similarly, we can derive the comparative statics for the critical threshold for FDI to be 
profitable. 
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as FDI
ˆE  differs from XˆE  only in the fixed costs and the iceberg transportation costs.  
Finally, consider the critical threshold for FDI to dominate exporting 
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The comparative statics can be derived as follows 
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 9 Data Appendix 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Unless otherwise indicated, parent-level information comes from Dafne (Bureau van Dijk) and affiliate-level 
information comes from MiDi (Microdatabase Direct Investment, Deutsche Bundesbank). All values are in 
€1,000. Cash flow, cost efficiency, and exports are corrected for outliers by truncating the data at the 1st and 
99th percentile. Fixed asset share and the debt ratio are corrected for outliers by truncating the data at zero and 
at the 99th percentile. 
 
Variable Definition 
Cash flow Cash flows from operations.  
Cost efficiency Sales / total cost (labor cost plus other input cost) 
Debt ratio (leverage) Total debt / total assets 
Fixed asset share Fixed assets / total assets 
Exporter 0/1 dummy for domestic exports for last reporting year. 
FDI firm 0/1 dummy for German firms with foreign affiliates. Dafne data supplemented 
by MiDi 
Size Total assets 
Exports Exports for the last reporting year calculated via the export share of turnover 
Foreign Sales Turnover of foreign affiliates 
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Table 2: Sector Classifications 
Sector definitions and based on two-digits classification WZ2003. 
Manufacturing Service Other 
Chemicals Education Agriculture & Fishing 
Coking Finacial services Construction 
Food & Tobacco Health Energy 
Furniture Hotels & Restaurants Mining 
Glas Other services n.e.c. 
Leather Real estate and Busines services  
Machinery Trade & Repair  
Metals Transport & communication  
Office equipment   
Paper   
Rubber & Plastics   
Textiles     
Vehicles   
Wood   
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 Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
This table provides summary statistics for the full sample used in the regressions below, as well as for the 
different types of firms within the full sample. 
(a) By type of firm 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Full sample           
Cash flow (log) 99,880 5.4923 2.2314 0.0000 10.6526
Cost efficiency (%) 80,897 1.3302 0.4253 0.3842 4.7479
Debt ratio (%) 115,565 0.5632 0.2858 0.0000 0.9986
Fixed /total assets (%) 105,648 0.2745 0.2717 0.0000 0.9698
Size(log) 119,236 8.0331 2.3813 0.0000 18.4816
Purely national firms     
Cash flow (log) 87,183 5.2671 2.2029 0.0000 10.6526
Cost efficiency (%) 69,188 1.3377 0.4439 0.3842 4.7479
Debt ratio (%) 100,507 0.5719 0.2897 0.0000 0.9986
Fixed/total assets (%) 91,264 0.2862 0.2810 0.0000 0.9698
Size(log) 104,131 7.7637 2.3213 0.0000 16.8938
Exporters      
Cash flow (log) 1,672 7.9183 1.3671 1.9459 10.6363
Cost efficiency (%) 1,702 1.2786 0.1992 0.4521 3.2415
Debt ratio (%) 1,942 0.4385 0.2132 0.0077 0.9919
Fixed /total assets (%) 1,909 0.1932 0.1439 0.0000 0.7586
Size(log) 1,944 10.7935 1.4710 3.9120 18.4816
FDI firms      
Cash flow (log) 4,242 7.6344 1.7661 0.0000 10.6483
Cost efficiency (%) 4,004 1.3080 0.3843 0.3910 4.7326
Debt ratio (%) 5,648 0.4588 0.2549 0.0000 0.9986
Fixed /total assets (%) 5,181 0.1566 0.1813 0.0000 0.9635
Size(log) 5,681 10.7983 1.9908 1.3863 17.7721
Manufacturing firms         
Cash flow (log) 27,777 6.0078 1.1341 0.0000 10.2088
Cost efficiency (%) 20,301 1.2826 0.3867 0.3845 4.7479
Debt ratio (%) 30,859 0.5894 0.2665 0.0000 0.9986
Fixed /total assets (%) 23,462 6.2171 1.8828 0.0000 10.6526
Size(log) 21,212 1.3047 0.2798 0.3855 4.6603
Service firms           
Cash flow (log) 62,164 5.2984 2.3129 0.0000 10.6525
Cost efficiency (%) 45,951 1.3556 0.4881 0.3842 4.7479
Debt ratio (%) 72,744 0.5564 0.2993 0.0000 0.9986
Fixed /total assets (%) 64,137 0.2772 0.2946 0.0000 0.9698
Size(log) 76,067 7.8821 2.5128 0.0000 18.4816
(b) By industry 
This table provides an overview of the different types of firms and their frequencies and shares in the 
regression sample. There are 28,380 other firms in the full sample (including agriculture, mining, energy, 
private households etc.). Number of firms refers to firm-year observations. 
  Manufacturing Services Full sample 
Purely national 31,884 126,372 185,910 
(% in industry group) 71.04 92.54 88.53 
    
Exporting only 8,297 3,618 12,234 
(% in industry group) 18.49 2.65 5.83 
    
FDI + exporting 2,090 805 2,973 
(% in industry group) 4.66 0.59 1.42 
    
FDI only 2,613 5,761 8,871 
(% in industry group) 5.82 4.22 4.22 
        
Total (firm-year obs.) 44,884 136,556 209,988 
% 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 4: Corrected Versus Regression Sample 
This table compares the sample corrected for outliers (“corrected sample”) and the sample used for the 
regressions in Table 5 (“Regression sample”). The two samples differ because of missing observations for 
the explanatory variables. We do not compare the regression sample with the original Dafne data 
(“uncorrected sample”) because of obviously wrong observations in the Dafne data prior to our outlier 
correction. 
      Regression sample     Corrected sample    
       Sales     Sales  
    Number % ( million € ) % Number % ( million € ) % 
Agriculture & Fishing 1,172 1.68 5.242 0.18 2,434 1.49 12.744 0.16
Chemicals  1,034 1.48 87.587 3.04 1,906 1.17 251.176 3.17
Construction  8,100 11.62 91.424 3.18 17,210 10.56 184.136 2.32
Education  272 0.39 3.293 0.11 797 0.49 17.049 0.21
Energy  2,307 3.31 189.569 6.59 4,265 2.62 598.185 7.54
Financial services 298 0.43 18.128 0.63 1,904 1.17 109.834 1.38
Food & Tobacco 1,553 2.23 170.178 5.92 2,864 1.76 387.081 4.88
Furniture  973 1.40 30.891 1.07 1,802 1.11 49.102 0.62
Glass  792 1.14 27.771 0.97 1,515 0.93 52.436 0.66
Health  2,303 3.30 75.070 2.61 4,595 2.82 158.890 2.00
Hotels & Restaurants 599 0.86 7.012 0.24 1,549 0.95 17.713 0.22
Coking  77 0.11 31.912 1.11 162 0.10 64.275 0.81
Leather  50 0.07 1.587 0.06 96 0.06 2.871 0.04
Machinery  3,163 4.54 134.148 4.66 5,930 3.64 317.838 4.01
Metals  3,983 5.71 121.496 4.22 7,614 4.67 283.223 3.57
Mining  257 0.37 9.510 0.33 571 0.35 128.759 1.62
Office equipment 2,396 3.44 106.803 3.71 4,712 2.89 253.020 3.19
Other services 2,382 3.42 72.735 2.53 6,478 3.98 213.486 2.69
Paper  1.546 2.22 55.355 1.92 3,051 1.87 138.107 1.74
Real estate & Business services 13,535 19.42 487.442 16.94 44,001 27.01 1.535.839 19.37
Rubber & Plastics 1,153 1.65 53.148 1.85 2,151 1.32 88.540 1.12
Textiles  721 1.03 20.997 0.73 1,335 0.82 55.160 0.70
Trade & repair 16,429 23.57 869.501 30.22 34,625 21.25 2.047.556 25.82
Transport & Communication 3,428 4.92 134.980 4.69 8,329 5.11 631.068 7.96
Vehicles  733 1.05 57.784 2.01 1,436 0.88 297.970 3.76
Wood  437 0.63 11.700 0.41 920 0.56 20.855 0.26
n.e.c  8 0.01 1.636 0.06 684 0.42 13.808 0.17
Total   69,701 100 2,876.898 100 162,936 100 7,930.719 100
 
